2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

7-6-2021

Alejandro Morales v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Gr

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"Alejandro Morales v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Gr" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 560.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/560

This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 20-1827
____________
ALEJANDRO MORALES,
On behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Appellant
v.
HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC;
JOHN DOES 1 TO 10
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-08401)
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas
____________
Argued on March 23, 2021
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 6, 2021)
Yongmoon Kim [argued]
Philip D. Stern
KIM LAW FIRM LLC
411 Hackensack Avenue
Suite 701
Hackensack, NJ 07601
Counsel for Appellant
Sean X. Kelly
Christian M. Scheuerman [argued]
Jonathan R. Stuckel
Marks O’Neill O’Brien Doherty & Kelly

535 Rt. 38 East, Suite 501
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
Counsel for Appellee
___________
OPINION*
____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Debt collectors violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f(8), when they send consumers envelopes showing certain quick reference (QR)
codes. DiNaples v. MRS BPO, LLC, 934 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2019). In this case, Healthcare
Revenue Recovery Group (HRRG) sent Alejandro Morales a debt collection letter in an
envelope showing a barcode. Morales sued, but the District Court dismissed his case,
holding he lacked standing under the FDCPA. We will reverse and remand.
I
We begin with a brief description of the mailing at issue. A smartphone could scan
the envelope’s barcode to reveal an “Internal Reference Number” (IRN)—UM###2—and
the first ten characters of Morales’s street address. The letter listed Morales’s account
numbers with HRRG and his creditor—but all of that was hidden.
Morales filed a class action, claiming the letter violated the FDCPA. After
discovery, the District Court dismissed his complaint. It decided Morales lacked standing
because he lacked a concrete injury in fact. App. 12–15. After we decided DiNaples,
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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Morales filed a motion for reconsideration. The District Court denied it, reasoning that
the DiNaples disclosure and this disclosure were different. App. 20–23.
Morales appealed.1 He challenges the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint for lack of standing, its order denying his motion to reconsider or amend, and
its order denying his discovery request for every putative class member’s account
documents.
II2
The FDCPA bans “unfair or unconscionable” debt collection. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
Specifically, the FDCPA protects consumers by ensuring letters arrive in plain envelopes:
it prohibits “[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on
any envelope when” sending mail. § 1692f(8). So HRRG broke the law when it placed a
barcode on the envelope. But not all transgressions create standing—procedural gaffes
that cause no “concrete” injury fall short of Article III’s requirements. Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992).
Intangible harms like privacy abuses can be concrete. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
When determining whether an intangible, statutory harm is concrete, courts look to
common law analogies and Congress’s judgment. Id. If a statutory harm is concrete, no

1

HRRG claims the appeal was untimely. But the timeliness clock runs from the order’s
entry—not its signature date. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). So the appeal is timely.
2

We have jurisdiction over the appeal to determine if Morales has standing. See
DiNaples, 934 F.3d at 278 n.2.
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“additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified” is required. Id.; accord
DiNaples, 934 F.3d at 279.
The District Court determined HRRG’s disclosure did not reveal protected
information because multiple debtors could share one IRN. App. 12–13, 22–23 & n.2. So
it held Morales did not have a concrete injury. App. 14–15, 21–24.
Morales challenges this ruling and relies on three of our cases. In Douglass v.
Convergent Outsourcing, we held that an envelope listing the debtor’s account number
with the collection company violated the FDCPA because the information “could be used
to expose [the debtor’s] financial predicament.” 765 F.3d 299, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2014). In
St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., we reiterated that disclosing an
account number on an envelope creates standing. 898 F.3d 351, 355, 357–58 (3d Cir.
2018). And in DiNaples, an envelope’s QR code contained the “internal reference
number associated with DiNaples’s account” at the debt collection agency. 934 F.3d at
278. The injury was concrete—and “closely related to” common law privacy torts—
because the QR code made protected information “accessible to the public.” Id. at 280
(quoting St. Pierre, 898 F.3d at 358). No more was needed. Id.
In this appeal, we must decide whether this IRN (UM###2) is protected like the
DiNaples account number (LU4.###1813.3683994). See 934 F.3d at 278. To answer this
question, we turn to the record. We begin by acknowledging, as HRRG argues, that
others may “potentially” share Morales’s IRN. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 135-4, at 8–9, 12.
Even so, the IRN’s uses reveal its disclosure was a concrete injury.
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HRRG’s representative first explained that the company software generated IRNs
to link incoming debt collection requests with debtor information in a database. Id. at 11–
12. The IRN was key to processing undeliverable mail. See id. at 17, 19. Workers
scanned the returned envelopes’ barcodes, and when a barcode matched a database
record, HRRG knew it could no longer reach the debtor at that address. See id. And the
IRN could enable public access to the account. A phone call to HRRG with the IRN and a
second piece of information, like a birthdate, allowed account access. Id. at 14. HRRG’s
website also allowed anyone with the IRN and information visible on the envelope,
together with an email address, to update some of the debtor’s contact information. Id. at
16.
In sum, just as the QR code in DiNaples might disclose the debtor’s financial
predicament, so too could Morales’s barcode. In both cases, the numbers are only
assigned to debtors. See id. at 10–11; DiNaples, 934 F.3d at 278–80. And the IRN
enabled identification in at least three ways. In essence, the IRN is “a piece of
information capable of identifying [Morales] as a debtor,” so its disclosure was a concrete
harm. Douglass, 765 F.3d at 306.3

3

After lengthy discovery, Morales requested account information for the entire potential
class. If he had access to all that information, he might disprove HRRG’s shared IRN
theory. But standing does not require uniqueness, and the District Court decided the
request was “unreasonably cumulative and untimely.” App. 9. We agree and find no
abuse of discretion. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344,
365 (3d Cir. 2001).
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III
HRRG makes three arguments to the contrary: IRNs are not account numbers;
Morales did not know how to use IRNs to unlock private data; and material risk of harm
was absent. These arguments fall flat. Account numbers are but one type of protected
information. And Morales did not need to know how to use IRNs to access accounts. Nor
did he need to show an increased risk of harm. Just as disclosing the “meaningless string
of numbers and letters” in Douglass was a concrete harm, 765 F.3d at 305–06, so too
here.
HRRG also offers two district court cases in support. HRRG Br. 21; see also App.
22 (citing Est. of Caruso v. Fin. Recoveries, 2017 WL 2704088, at *6 (D.N.J. June 22,
2017) and Anenkova v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 201 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2016)).
But the envelopes in those cases did not disclose protected information. See Caruso,
2017 WL 2704088, at *6; Anenkova, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 637.
Finally, HRRG urges us to distinguish In re Horizon Healthcare Services Data
Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017). There, a data breach revealed
information like addresses and birthdays. Id. at 630. HRRG claims the barcode’s data is
different from the personal information in Horizon because the IRN is “meaningless on
its face” and not “private information.” HRRG Br. 17. But the IRN is private information,
so Horizon supports our conclusion. Disclosing “personal information” is a concrete
injury. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 629; accord St. Pierre, 898 F.3d at 357.
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The envelope’s barcode disclosed Morales’s protected information, which caused
a concrete injury in fact under the FDCPA. So we will reverse the District Court’s order
dismissing Morales’s action for lack of standing and its order denying Morales’s motion
to reconsider. We will also affirm the District Court’s discovery order and remand the
case for further proceedings.
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